We have pleasure in reporting the conclusion of the assignment given to the Petroleum Revenue Special Task Force (PRSTF) in accordance with its Terms of Reference as laid out at the inauguration of the Task Force. We enclose our final report of work done together with our key findings and recommendations.
Our overall approach has been prescriptive and consultative with various stakeholder groups within the Petroleum Industry providing in our estimation a unique opportunity to address some long standing issues that affect the industry.
This is our final report of the assignment. Accordingly, this report supersedes earlier copies used for presentations and discussions.
We take this opportunity to thank all the Government Agencies and Private Organisations in the Petroleum Sector who assisted us by providing us with information and documentation from the Operator’s records.
We appreciate the opportunity given to us to be of service to the Ministry and the Nation on this most important assignment.
Mallam Nuhu Ribadu Olasupo Shasore SAN
Chairman, PRSTF Member/Secretary
The Honourable Minister of Petroleum Resources, driven by the need to strengthen the institutions responsible for Petroleum Revenue Management, commissioned the Petroleum Revenue Special Task force (PRSTF) on 28
February 2012. The goal of the Task Force was to support the programme of the Federal Government of Nigeria in enhancing optimization, probity and accountability in the operations of the Petroleum Industry.
As part of this agenda and the issues arising from the various fiscal regimes existing in the sector, there arose an urgent need to establish the streams of revenue flows from the Petroleum sector to the Federal Republic of Nigeria and design systems and processes which would enhance the accountability of each agency or entity.
The assignment of the Special Task Force is contained in its Terms of Reference and covers the entire Petroleum Value Chain. Accordingly, the Task Force set out to confirm if existing systems, laws, processes and functions across the value chain provide reasonable assurance that revenues from the Petroleum Industry are captured, complete, recorded intact, properly accounted for and that revenue due is demanded and collected.
Terms of Reference
At the inauguration of the Petroleum Revenue Special Task Force, the following Terms of Reference (ToR) were communicated:
1. To work with consultants and experts to determine and verify all petroleum upstream and downstream revenues (taxes, royalties, etc) due and payable to Federal Government of Nigeria;
2. To take all necessary steps to collect all debts due and owing; to obtain agreements and enforce payment terms by all oil industry operators;
To design a cross debt matrix between all Agencies and Parastatals of the Ministry of Petroleum Resources;
4. To develop an automated platform to enable effective tracking, monitoring and online validation of income and debt drivers of all Parastatals and Agencies in the Federal Ministry of Petroleum Resources;
5. To work with world-class consultants to integrate systems and technology across the production chain to determine and monitor crude oil production and exports, ensuring at all times, the integrity of payments to the Federal Government of Nigeria; and
6. To submit monthly reports for ministerial review and further action.
Scope and Methodology
Since its inauguration, members of the PRSTF have approached the assignment with all the seriousness that it deserves. In carrying out its ToR, one of the initial activities performed by the PRSTF was to obtain both written and verbal presentations from the various stakeholder groups within the Petroleum Industry. This was to enable the Task Force to understand the challenges faced and the type of reforms that are required. This was all carried out with a view to determining and optimising the nation s revenue streams from all sectors within the industry.
The Task Force members also visited and reviewed selected agencies and operators, supported by the Consultants, for the period spanning 1 January 2005 to 31 December 2011 in line with the Statute of Limitations. Two workshops were also held to aid information gathering process with respect to key issues of Metering and Measurement in the Oil & Gas Sector Value Chain, and Security in the Oil and Gas Sector.
Apart from several plenary meetings to receive briefings, analyse gathered information and deliberate on findings, the Task Force also operated through constituted two (2) ad-hoc subcommittees to conduct a detailed review of NNPC s and DPR s roles in petroleum revenue management.
Five (5) standing subcommittees were also formed and conducted detailed assessments followed with recommendations in specific areas relevant to the overall ToR. Specifically in pursuance of ToR 2, the Task Force through the Security and Enforcement Subcommittee also liaised with relevant agencies to validate the status of outstanding debts identified in the course of the forensic review, and to demand payments where deemed necessary.
Revenue Review and Debt Verification Findings
The Task Force in pursuance of ToR 1 and 2 conducted activities to determine and verify all Petroleum Upstream and Downstream Revenues due and payable to Nigeria; and took all necessary steps to collect all debts due and owing.
It was determined that the main petroleum revenues due to the national treasury in respect of oil and gas activities in Nigeria are:
Domestic Crude Oil Sales, Equity Crude Oil Sales, Gas Sales, Refined Petroleum Products sales, Profits from NNPC subsidiaries, Petroleum Profits Tax, Company Income Tax, Signature Bonus, Concession Rentals, Royalties from Oil and Gas, Gas Flare Penalties, and Miscellaneous Oil Revenues.
The Task Force s key findings are presented below according to these revenue streams.
1. Proceeds from the sale of Domestic Crude Oil
As at 31 December 2011, N843 million1 was due to the Federation in respect of Domestic Crude Oil allocations. The amounts outstanding as at 31 December 2011 represent amounts due for the months of September 2011 to December
2011. In view of the 90-day credit period, the outstanding amount as at 31 December 2011 was not due for payment.
The Task Force received representations from the NNPC and other relevant agencies on the Corporation s practice of deducting amounts for subsidy-related expenses prior to remittance of these revenues. In the course of the Task Force s work, we did not receive sufficient justification for the practice which does not accord with the law, with particular reference to the Constitution.
1 PRSTF is aware that further settlement should now have reflected providing figures as at April 2012
Our review of the records received for 2002 to 2011 showed an inconsistent pattern in the implementation of the policy to allocate 445,000bpd allocation to NNPC, with variances found for the ten years reviewed.
The Task Force also compared the average price per barrel payable by NNPC for Domestic Crude with the average weekly prices for Nigeria Bonny Light, Forcados, obtained from the Energy Information Administration (EIA). The review revealed that over a 10 year period (2002 2011), the State may have been short paid by an estimated sum of US$ 5 billion, although it was understood from discussions with NNPC officials that the pricing of domestic crude oil was based on international prices. Enquiries from NNPC revealed that up until October 2003, NNPC was granted fixed price regimes which explain the wide disparity in prices in the earlier years.
The Task Force found that the exchange rates used in arriving at the Naira equivalent of the amounts payable differed from the CBN rates for six (6) of the ten (10) years reviewed. The potential underpayment of amounts payable to the Federation Account over the 10- year period is estimated at N86.6 billion. Also, the Task Force s review of the domestic crude utilisation showed that the percentage not refined in- country ranged from between 50% to 88% over the 10 year period.
2. Proceeds from Equity Crude Oil Sales:
Equity Crude represents government s share of crude oil production (excluding domestic crude) obtained mainly from three (3) arrangements: Joint Operating Agreements (JOA) with IOCs, Production Sharing Contracts (PSC) and Service Contracts. Equity Crude Oil proceeds are remitted into the Federation account as export proceeds, DPR accounts as Royalties and FIRS accounts as Petroleum Profit Tax.
The Task Force observed that there is no single point accountability for the income and expenditure streams of upstream petroleum operations, compounded by the current structure of NNPC such as multiple roles executed through NAPIMS and its COMD.
A decline was also observed in national investments that would increase the nation s proven reserves. Accordingly, despite the increase in crude oil production in Nigeria over the years, the nation s entitlement has decreased as a result of various alternative funding arrangements for its upstream investments.
The Task Force found that legislation governing the industry and agreements with third parties are outdated, do not reflect current economic or legal realities; or include ambiguous clauses. Also, there are some provisions within the legislation that could significantly improve government s revenue that the government is yet to take advantage of. Examples include a provision to ensure that the share of the Government of the Federation in the additional revenue shall be adjusted under the Production Sharing Contracts if the price of crude oil at any time exceeds $20 per barrel; and the requirement for a periodic review of provisions in specified time frames.
It was also observed that some traders lifted crude oil although they were not listed on the approved master list of customers who had a valid contract and were selected through an annual bidding process. The Task Force research also found that quite a number of traders did not demonstrate renowned expertise in the business of crude oil trading.
Furthermore, the Task Force found that the use of crude oil traders was contrary to the global trend wherein national oil companies develop their own trading arms, such as the various NNPC trading subsidiaries which currently have limited capacity. The Task Force identified various concerns in this area with Nigeria being the world s only major oil producer that sells 100 percent of its crude to private commodities traders, rather than directly to refineries. Various submissions to the Task Force demonstrated the potential for lost margins to middlemen, manipulation of pricing, suboptimal returns and market fraud as emanating from this policy and practice.
A review of NAPIMS s audited financial statements as at 31 December 2009 showed that Joint Venture cash calls payable was N459.568billion. Since 2006, government has not allocated enough funds to cover these amounts and NNPC has entered into a range of borrowing arrangements referred to as Alternative Financing Arrangements with the costs of financing this debt (estimated at around 8%) continuously mounting. This cycle will continue to increase in the coming years unless a systemic solution is found.
As JV partners there is a need for the effective management and oversight of oil companies operating costs which affects revenues accruable to Nigeria. There is also a clear training, technology and human capacity gap between NAPIMS staff and their counterparts in the private oil and gas sector.
3. Proceeds from the Sale of the National Entitlement (Gas):
The Task Force aided by the Consultants identified a total of N137.572 billion ($946.878 million) due to the Federation from SNEPCO representing the proceeds of gas sales from the Bonga oil field; according to the NNPC (NAPIMS) Financial Statements for the year ended 31 December 2009.
For Liquefied Natural Gas, the price observed at which the feedstock gas is sold to NLNG seems too generous, compared to prices obtainable on the international market. The estimated cumulative of the deficit between value obtainable on the international market and what is currently being obtained from NLNG, over the 10 year period, amounts to approximately US$29 billion.
4. Proceeds from Sale of Petroleum Products:
From the Task Force s review, NNPC is owed N27billion including current debt, total overdue, disputed debt and total debt outstanding, by the major marketers of petroleum products. We also found that amounts payable to suppliers of petroleum products, as at 31 December 2011 amounts to approximately US$3.6 billion, of which US$2.7 billion represents amounts outstanding for over 365 days. The Task Force also observed that pipeline product loss has steadily increased over the years.
5. NNPC and Subsidiaries:
From review of the latest available audited financial statements (2009) it was noted that NNPC has sixteen (16) subsidiaries. The financial performance of the Corporation and its subsidiaries in 2009 shows the Group had a deficit of approximately N298billion for the period. Various reviews conducted by the Task Force showed that the NNPC does not receive the required capital to grow its assets or meet operating costs. NNPC has therefore increasingly relied on the FGN for lines of credit, and deduction of oil revenue due to the Federation Account. In our review, the legal basis for this practice was unclear.
6. Signature Bonus:
The Task Force found that discretionary decision-making in the award of oil blocks can result in revenue losses for Nigeria. Our review also showed that the management of past bid rounds has resulted in lower demand and fewer qualified bidders, uncompleted deals weakened government returns, and lower development of acreage.
The DPR provided the task force with information indicating that 67 licenses were awarded between 1 January 2005 and 31 December 2011; with an outstanding balance of $566 million unpaid in signature bonuses. For the 7 discretionary allocations reviewed, the Task Force found $183million outstanding and due to the nation s treasury. We were however informed that of the total $749m outstanding in signature bonuses, $321m was legally disputed.
7. Concession Rentals:
The Task Force found that $2.9million represents outstanding amounts to be collected by the DPR from the various concessionaires. However, we also observed inconsistencies in records provided by DPR in respect of information and schedules regarding the list of concessions.
8. Royalties (Crude Oil and Gas):
The Task Force found that $3.027billion was outstanding from the operators for crude oil royalties as at 31 December 2011 per the DPR s records. Of this amount, the DPR had stipulated that ADDAX is liable to pay $1.5billion royalties under the 2003 fiscal regime and there is currently a dispute between Addax and NNPC on the one hand, and the DPR on the other. In the course of the review, the Task Force also encountered differences in records of payments made to the CBN vis- -vis DPR records, and lack of independent gas production and sales data.
9. Gas Flare Penalties:
The Task Force found that the DPR is currently unable to independently track and measure gas volumes produced and flared and depends largely on the information provided by the operators.
We also observed that the periodic reconciliation meetings with the operators to address the gas flare volumes were delayed with only 6 completed of 36 at the time of our review.
The total revenue from gas flaring during the review period was $175million with the balance outstanding as unpaid was approximately $58million indicating that $115million had been received by the DPR. We however reviewed payments received by the CBN in respect of gas flare penalties. However a review of CBN records showed that $137million was received between 1 January 2005 and 31 December 2011. The DPR was not able to reconcile the $115 million to the $137million.
Lastly, operators have not compiled with the recent Ministerial directive signed on 15 August 2011 increasing the gas penalty fee from N10.00 to $3.50. The operators have continued to flare gas at the rate of N10 and records at the DPR reveal that none of the companies have paid any gas penalty fee in 2012.
10. Miscellaneous Oil Revenues:
The Task Force was unable to obtain a comprehensive miscellaneous oil revenue schedule from the officials of the DPR, although a review of CBN s records provided some information albeit with unexplained variances. The amounts due in respect of the various fees relating to the miscellaneous oil revenues are also not reflective of the current economic realities.
Revenue Losses in the Nigerian Petroleum Industry The Task Force identified sources of revenue losses in the industry, with a view to identify opportunity areas for major reform in boosting resources obtainable from the sector for national development. These include the following.
1. Crude Oil Theft and Associated Revenue Losses: Hydrocarbon theft was found by the Task Force as being a major and chronic source of revenue loss to Nigeria. Theft of crude oil and refined petroleum products may be reaching emergency levels in Nigeria.
The Task Force observed various estimates by International Oil Companies and Government officials of the scale and volume of crude theft which ranged from 6 to 30 percent of production. While the Task Force does not endorse any of the numbers it received, we note that it could actually be as high as 250,000 barrels per day closer to 10% of daily productions amounting to as high as N1 trillion annually. This issue therefore requires immediate attention.
2. Lost Refined Products and Associated Revenue Losses
The Task Force did not receive comprehensive figures documenting volumes of refined products stolen or spilled. NNPC reports that thieves stole 3.2 million metric tons of products from its pipeline network between 2001 and 2010 and that about 40 percent of products currently channelled through pipelines are lost to theft and sabotage.
PPMC also recorded 4,468 product pipeline breaks in 2011, 98 percent of them from sabotage; and values the products stolen from its pipeline network between 2001 and 2010 at N178 billion.
3. NNPC Withholdings for Costs Associated With Theft and Sabotage NNPC withholds oil revenues from the Federation Account to cover costs associated with theft and pipeline sabotage.
4. Pioneer Status granted to Indigenous Companies
The Task Force was informed that at least five companies: Allied Energy, Midwestern Oil & Gas, Brittania Oil Nigeria Limited, Suntrust Oil Company Nigeria Limited; and Niger Delta Petroleum Resources Limited2 have been granted pioneer status by the Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission (with others pending or undetected) for their exploration and production activities.
The Task Force finds that the granting of pioneer status to oil operators for an activity that is well established for over 40 years inappropriate. The loss of revenue from the grant of pioneer status to oil operators is an avoidable loss and it is recommended that any such further consideration be stopped forthwith and the current ones set aside and or revoked.
1.Collateral Social Costs of Theft:
The Task Force also found that certain social costs emanated from crude oil theft and considered them important and requiring urgent attention. These include environmental
2 The argument that the status is appropriate for exploration and not production is untenable and self-defeating because once it is accepted that production is already being carried on in Nigeria the same goes for exploration pollution and its socioeconomic impacts, armed piracy, and lost investment in the sector leading to revenue losses.
Based on the detailed review of outstanding debts owed to the Federation, the Task Force determined outstanding amounts for royalties, signature bonuses and concession rentals. Pursuant to an initial understanding of ToR 2 of the PRSTF, relevant government agencies were invited to assist in a debt collection drive, and invitation and demand letters were sent to over 47 oil companies allegedly indebted to the nation. We have recommended that government pursue debts further in any manner deemed appropriate.
However during the debt reconciliation exercise, the sum of USD$5,830,261 was paid into the treasury of Government with evidence of payment, while several companies made undertakings to pay at later dates.
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